Sidetalk

Digested version:  bankers ignorant, reckless.  The Treasury committee of the Parliament has now issued its report after hearings conducted in 2007.  Readers’ Digest version:  bankers and credit rating agencies were ignorant, reckless.  As reported by the Telegraph, today’s report says that banks had not understood the financial products they were buying and selling.  “The committee singled out Lord Aldington, chairman of the Deutsche Bank’s London branch, who declined to explain the difference between a CDO and a CDO-squared when he appeared before them.”  The committee also lambasted the credit rating agencies for not responding earlier to the crisis in the US sub-prime mortgage market, and for alarming investors by making large downgrades at the height of the crisis.  Read the full report (pdf) here: 

parliamentbanks0308.pdf

Here is a copy of Bill Ackman’s latest letter on the monoline mess, dated January 30, 2008,  to the New York State Insurance Department.  AMBAC exposed to $11.61 BILLION losses; MBIA loss exposure $11.65 BILLION.  A “must read.”  →     ackman131ltr.pdf

This is a big issue, and Moody’s tried to explain.  A municipal security apparently will then carry whichever rating is higher (its own or the monoline).

“If a security is wrapped by a financial guarantor, and has a published underlying rating that is higher than the guarantor’s rating, what is the Moody’s rating on the security?

A: The Moody’s rating is the higher of (i) the guarantor’s financial strength rating and (ii) any published underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security. For US municipal securities, we also consider any enhanced rating based on a state credit enhancement program. For structured finance securities, we also consider any published rating on a pari passu (i.e., at the same level of seniority) non-sequential tranche or more junior tranche of the same transaction.”  Read the entire Moody’s explanation on the Bond insurers/monolines page.

We all know the monolines (bond insurers) are a huge mess.  Although they insure massive amounts of debt, they themselves appear to lack the assets to honor those obligations. How best to fix this mess? 

Bill Ackman’s recent presentation is highly recommended reading.  It has an A to Z analysis of how the bond insurers do business, financial condition, and — go to page 134 of his analysis — a very cogent outline of how the scenario will play out.  Spoiler:  he says downgrades, bankruptcy, receivership.

Here it is:  howtosavethebondinsurers.pdf

Moody’s, whilst maintaining its high ratings of the monolines, issued a stern sounding almost Puritanical caution to the nations of the Arabian Gulf (Kuwait, Qatar,  Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and UAE ). 

Moody’s is worried that these nations are making and spending so much money (driving inflation).  Moody’s issued Speccial Announcements on the Governments of the Arabian oil producing countries — implying that if they keep on their path of making and spending lots of money, their national credit rating will be scrutinized and may be downgraded.  And this is at the very same time that the U.S. is deep into deficit spending.  Hmmm.

Excerpt: ”Gulf States’ Spending Hikes Could Have Future Ratings Impact”

 ”Moody’s acknowledges that, over the short to medium-term, the robust creditworthiness of GCC governments is unlikely to be undermined by strong spending growth. This is because oil prices remain at historically high levels, generally wide fiscal surpluses are being maintained despite spending increases, and GCC governments have accumulated large cushions of net assets with which to meet potential future liabilities.”

“However, there could be longer-term adverse implications: the danger is that governments will find themselves dependent on ever higher oil prices to balance their budgets, making it more difficult for them to adjust in the event of a downturn in revenues. Large increases in current expenditure are of particular concern as they are more difficult to reverse than hikes in capital spending in the event of a potential downturn in revenues.” 

Does anyone else think this is a funny way for Moody’s to be spending its time nowadays?

Satyajit Das opines that the tools available to central banks are inadequate to address the scope of the global economic problems we face.  The black box or shadow economy may involve the unwinding of “innovative” financial products/derivatives such that monetary and fiscal policy simply will not work this time. 

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/01/27/the_black_box_economy/

Clayton Holdings, the largest provider of due diligence review of mortgages for the major mortgage bankers, has been given immunity by NY Attorney General Cuomo.  It appears from this news that the mortgage bankers wanted the due diligence reviews to find fewer “lending exceptions” in the subprime loans than actually existed.  It is suggested that the actual figure is 50%-80% of the loans had lending exceptions.  The due diligence reviews may have been limited to small numbers of loans within the portfolios, so that when the loans were bundled and securitized they would appear to be higher quality credits than they actually were. 

This is interesting for a number of reasons, including the question of the rating agencies’ culpability and the monolines’ liability.  Read the NY Times  story here: (more…)

From Goode Value Investing  http://www.goodevalue.com/2008/01/22/bill-ackmans-letter-to-rating-agencies-regarding-bond-insurers/:  Bill Ackman is apparently asking the ratings companies the questions we all want answered.  It’s an excellent letter with a concise explanation of the facts, and the consequences of the facts.  The letter observes it is unlikely that MBIA, Ambac and other insurers will be able to continue as going concerns. Finally, the letter asks the ultimate question:  When the rating companies look at themselves in the mirror, how can they possibly say that MBIA and others deserve their highest (Triple A) rating? 

Here is text of the letter: 
January 18, 2008

Mr. Raymond McDaniel Mr. Stephen Joynt
Executive Chairman and CEO CEO and President
Moody’s Corp. Fitch Ratings
99 Church St. One State Street Plaza
New York, NY 10007 New York, NY 10004

Mr. Deven Sharma
President
Standard & Poor’s
55 Water Street
New York, NY 10041

Re: Bond Insurer Ratings

Ladies and Gentlemen:

As a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch
have been granted a level of authority that capital market participants and Federal and
State regulators have historically relied upon in evaluating the safety and soundness of
corporations, regulated financial institutions, and structured finance securities. To state
the obvious, because of your critical role in the capital markets, it is essential that the
ratings you publish are the result of comprehensive and accurate analysis.

(more…)

It’s no secret anymore that the monolines really don’t have the wherewithal to properly “insure” credit derivatives such as CDOs.  And the first hand evidence is piling in that the monolines apparently knew all along what they were doing — and kept right on “insuring” CDOs and other junky derivatives.  Why?  Profit, of course.  Where did all that money go?  Wherever it went, it’s high time for someone to go and get it back. 

My idea:  let the ratings companies (Fitch, Standard & Poors, et al.) who bestowed AAA ratings to this mess.  Perhaps they should disgorge all the revenue they collected as a result.  Seems as if they were unjustly enriched at the expense of …. all of us?

So - who spilled the beans?  Well, for one, former ACA Capital honcho (now literally put out to pasture?) as quoted at length in Bloomberg:

“Municipal bond insurers such as MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group Inc. had a good thing going.  For years, they earned some of the highest profit margins in any industry — by writing coverage for securities sold by states and cities to build roads, schools and firehouses. 

(more…)

How would you like to be an employee of a monoline, and being required to invest your 401(k) in company stock?  Apparently that’s exactly what MBIA required its employees to do — and now they are suing in an ERISA class action:

http://www.primenewswire.com/ca/news.html?d=134191

The same issue exists for the subprime lenders.  Are they requiring their employees to invest their retirement funds in company stock (while the company officers and directors dump the stock)?  Here is one example of a retiree of Freemont alleging just that in a recent (and still pending) lawsuit: (more…)

Update:  What About the Munis?  → good article:   http://wallstreetexaminer.com/blogs/winter/?p=1348

Is the current credit crisis and resulting loss of asset valuation having an impact on pensions and healthcare benefits?

Yes - see two preliminary reports below.

pew.pdf     ← The Pew Center on the States released a report in December 2007 highlighting the perilous footing of  the states’ funding of their long-term retiree benefits (both pension and nonpension).  Click through to full report.  

(more…)

Monolines are in deep trouble.  That’s not news -  well-covered by FT Alphaville, Calculated Risk, Reggie Middleton, and Mish’s. 

 FT Alphaville notes today:

In a credit note sent out to clients on Friday, RBS started to outline what it thought was on the horizon for the monolines: (more…)

The risks of CDO meltdowns have been well-recognized for at least the last decade.  CDOs are necessarily dependent on the underlying collateral portfolio because CDOs necessarily separate the performance of the issuing bank from the performance of the issued notes.  The inherent risks of CDO nonperformance have long been known and discussed.  In her November, 1998 analysis, Karen Spinner gives an exceptionally cogent listing and explanation of these risks.  For example, Model Risk dictates that the investor consider the possibility that the rating agency’s models “may not bee 100% accurate.”  Liquidity Risk means that it is hard for an issuer to unwind a closed CDO structure. 

Her excellent piece is entitled “CDOs Under Fire - What will happen to CDOs if credit fears paralyze financial markets?”.  Too bad more institutional investors and other players apparently did not pay enough attention here.  Apparently the credit fears have now virtually paralyzed the financial markets and we’ll have to observe the actual consequences to these derivative instruments. 

Link to Spinner piece here:

http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/1998/1198fea1.asp