Sidetalk

A very important speech today by Jeffrey Lacker, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Highlights include his views on the moral hazard created by central bank bailing out financial institutions:
“People often think of the moral hazard problem associated with a financial safety net as a “due diligence” problem. That is, investors in protected securities or lenders to protected institutions feel less of a need to assess and monitor the creditworthiness of their counterparties. This is a valid concern, but I think it construes moral hazard too narrowly in this setting. My discussion of the choice of leverage points to broader implications of central bank lending for the contractual structure of financial arrangements, not just on the monitoring of investment portfolios. In particular, the expectation of safety net support can weaken the incentive of counterparties to build provisions in to their financial contracts that reduce their susceptibility to (non-fundamental) runs. More broadly, an intermediary with access to the financial safety net has less incentive to manage their liquidity in a way that suitably minimizes the possibility of disorderly resolution of solvency problems.

Recent work by one of our Richmond Fed economists makes this point very clearly, using the standard model of banking theory. He and his New York Fed coauthor consider a setting in which if there is certainty that no government (or central bank) assistance will be forthcoming, then the banking contracts developed will include provisions that allow for suspensions of payment and these will prevent non-fundamental runs from occurring. On the other hand, if such central bank assistance is possible and a non-fundamental run actually does start, the government will choose to intervene in order to alleviate the ex post inefficiency associated with a run. But, knowing that this intervention is forthcoming, banks do not self-protect, and thus leave themselves more susceptible to runs. So peoples’ expectations regarding central bank policy choices in times of stress can affect the very robustness of the system.

This strikes me as a deeper form of moral hazard than what people usually have in mind. In times of financial crisis, the understandable central bank imperative is to alleviate the stress. But the expectations such actions engender could very well make future crises more likely. The classic time consistency problem is as relevant to central bank credit policy as it is to monetary policy.”
Entire speech: http://www.richmondfed.org/news_and_speeches/presidents_speeches/index.cfm/id=107

For curiosity’s sake, take a look at the historical dollar amount of borrowing by depository institutions (banks) from the Federal Reserve.  It is hard not to notice that what we have here is unprecedented over the last 100 years.  When you hear someone say the credit crisis is almost over, check this chart and think again.

Total Borrowings of Depository Institutions from Fed. Reserve 1910 - present (Billions $US)

 Read the article (click) The Madness of Ben Bernanke  The G7 Meeting

The dollar is in a tailspin, the trade deficit is growing and a recession is on the horizon. The American way of life is in serious danger. But the head of the Federal Reserve keeps on pumping easy credit into the system — a crazy policy that will worsen the crisis.   So begins today’s article in Der Spiegel. 

This is us folks.  The US government, i.e. taxpayers, guarantees the NY Federal Reserve loan of $29,000,000,000 to JPMorgan/Bear Stearns.  Call and write your congressional representatives if you disagree.  Otherwise, you need not do anything.  Click to read the letter →  treasuryletter0308.pdf

Click through to see New York Federal Reserve Bank’s March 2008 chart explaining TAF, TSLF, among many others including acceptable collateral for each type of lending:

forms_of_fed_lending.pdf

 Jim Rogers’ reaction to Fed moves on Bloomberg  

The Federal Reserve has certain assets — about $800 Billion in Treasuries.  Once it lends away the additional $200 Billion announced today, and counting the TAFs (Term Auction Facilities), about one-half of the Fed’s reserve of Treasuries will be gone.  This chart shows the Fed’s reserves before this additional $200 billion is given out, so you’ll have to continue that line downwards to imagine what it’ll look like by the end of March:

Click on the thumbnail and weep.  This chart is the latest, and was updated as of 2/22/08.  It’s dramatic. ↓

Now click on this thumbnail to see latest (as of 2/15/0 Fed chart for banks’ total borrowings from the Federal Reserve -  without precedent it would seem.  ↓

                      For an excellent discussion of the meaning of all of this, check out “Borrowed Reserves and Tinfoil Hats” from Mish’s blog:  http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/02/borrowed-reserves-and-tin-foil-hats.html

Satyajit Das opines that the tools available to central banks are inadequate to address the scope of the global economic problems we face.  The black box or shadow economy may involve the unwinding of “innovative” financial products/derivatives such that monetary and fiscal policy simply will not work this time. 

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/01/27/the_black_box_economy/

Way back when he was “just” a Fed Governor, in 2002, Bernanke gave an amazing speech detailing what he would do to prevent or cure deflation.  I read him as saying that he doesn’t think the U.S. will go into deflation because our financial system (banks and household balance sheets) are so healthy (forget that now!).  The other reason he gives is that the Federal Reserve can itself prevent or cure deflation.  Bernanke gives a list of the steps he would take — and it looks as if he’s already several steps down on the list with the TAF auctions.  But never fear, as a bottom line Bernanke thinks we should all be comforted by the fact that if all else fails, he’s got a printing press (oops, a copy machine) to print lots of dollar bills and reinflate the economy. 

It’s true, and worth another close read: 

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/#f8

(more…)

Watching this testimony live, without benefit of transcript, Bernanke incredibly is saying there will NOT be a recession!  Forecasting slower growth picking up in late 2008.  Some decent questions from Congresspeople re: why would a rebate actually improve economy?  Shift from pro-savings economy to pro-debt, etc.

Comments? 

Why is Bernanke talking so optimistically (yet looking terrible)?

What will Congress do on fiscal side?

Will Bernanke lower rates on 1/30 and if so why?

Cheers!